Abstract -We show t h a t t h e use of a r o u n d function whose Walsh coefficients are divisible b y a high power of 2 m a y lead to a higher order differential attack.
I. HIGHER ORDER DIFFERENTIAL ATTACKS
We consider an r-round iterated block cipher with block This property is related to the Walsh spectrum of Fk.
For any a E F;, p a denotes the linear function x H CY . x where "." is the usual dot product. The Walsh spectrum of a function F from FZ into F; is the multiset
The nonlinearity of F is the Hamming distance between all 'pa o F and the set of affine functions. It is equal to
The minimum value for L ( F ) is 2 * and the functions achieving this value are called almost bent functions. They provide a high resistance to both linear and differential attacks [2] .
The derivative of a function F over Fg with respect to a
where the sum is an addition modulo 2. Suppose that for any round keys, the reduced cipher, i.e., the function Since the degree of an almost bent function cannot exceed ( n + 1 ) / 2 , this attack is feasible except for almost bent functions of maximal degree. But, it can be improved and performed for any almost bent functions when the round key is inserted by addition. It also applies when SI, is a permutation of an even number of variables which has the highest known nonlinearity. Except the inverse function, all known permutations S achieving C(S) = 2n/2+1 are such that all their Walsh
Theorem 1 also provides an explanation and a generalization of a 7-order differential attack on a reduced version of MISTYl [6, 11. This weakness originates from the use of almost bent substitution boxes in the cipher. n + l coefficients are divisible by either 2n/2 or 2"/*+l 131.
